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An Economic Appraisal of the
St. Lawrence Seaway
Marvin J. Barloon
IN 1959, for the first time in history, the Great Lakes have be-
come a full-scale segment of the world's ocean systems. While the
immediate consequences on lake-borne foreign trade have been unim-
pressive, it should be remembered that the opening season has been
merely an initial shake-down period, indicating little as to the longer-
run outlook.
Following a description of the physical features and a summary
of construction costs of the
St. Lawrence Seaway, this
THE Aumop (B.S., 1931, State University of article undertakes an assess-
Iowa, M.B.A., 1935, Harvard) is Professor of
Economics, Western Reserve University. ment of its competitive
strengths and limitations as
opposed to the ports of the
Atlantic and the Gulf coasts. On the basis of this assessment, the
outlook for foreign trade moving through the Seaway would appear
reasonably optimistic, although its scale will remain modest. The St.
Lawrence Seaway will not generate any vast commercial or industrial
growth in the Great Lakes area. But, it will doubtless contribute
significantly in those communities where growth is already under way.
PHYSICAL FEATURES
The Seaway forges the last link in the chain of deep waters from
Chicago to the Atlantic Ocean. Until 1959, of this entire distance
of 2,250 miles, only the short passage of 114 miles from Lake On-
tario to Montreal was subject to a normal depth limitation of less
than 25 feet. This short reach of the St. Lawrence River, consisting
of tumbling rapids, was circumvented by a series of 14-foot canals,
entirely within Canada, cluttered by 22 locks, each only 250 feet long,
too small for any but pocket-size ocean-going ships. The Seaway dis-
places this system with a new channel 27 feet deep served by only
seven locks, each with a usable length of 768 feet, big enough for the
largest lake carriers, and more than big enough for typical ocean
freighters.
Two of the new locks were built by the United States government
along the international boundary waters of New York State. The
other five were constructed by the Canadian government, four of
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them farther downstream in the approaches to Montreal where the
river lies entirely within Canada. The St. Lawrence estuary has thus
been fully integrated with the Great Lakes navigation system.
CONSTRUCTION COSTS
Because of the controversial nature of the Seaway, published
statements as to its cost are wildly confusing. One hears it referred
to as "the billion-dollar" Seaway. On the other hand, because Con-
gress actually appropriated only $140 million to its construction, this
figure is sometimes called its "cost." Either figure can be reconciled
with the truth.
The total cost of the Seaway and all related works, incurred by
the Canadian and American governments combined, will round out to
something exceeding $1.2 billion. However, $600 million of this is
chargeable to hydroelectric power construction and is being absorbed,
not by the two national governments, but by the Hydro-Electric
Power Commission of Ontario and the Power Authority of the State
of New York. The provision of Seaway channels establishes a nor-
mal 81-foot fall of water, ideal for power production as a joint facil-
ity of the navigation works. The energy output from the total in-
stalled capacity of 1,880,000 kilowatts is shared equally between On-
tario and New York State, and will be entirely self-liquidating by a
safe margin.
Of the remaining $600 million for navigation works, approxi-
mately $150 million represents improvement of channels and harbors
in the Great Lakes. Whereas the new waterway is 27 feet deep, ex-
isting channels in the lakes range from 21 to 26 feet, and these are
being deepened accordingly. This leaves $450 million expended on
the navigation features of the Seaway proper. Because most of the
locks fall within Canadian territory, the Dominion has provided most
of this money, leaving the United States Government burdened with
a construction outlay on navigation of only some $130 million. Thus,
including both the Seaway proper and the Great Lakes improve-
ments, the "billion-dollar Seaway" has actually cost the United States
government just $280 million. In addition, probably $300 million is
currently being spent by local governments and private enterprise on
water terminals and cargo-handling facilities. These, however, may
be classed as merely the first phase of a program of local and private
investment, and thus as one of the economic benefits of the Seaway
project.
TOLL RATES AND REVENUES
It is hoped that the St. Lawrence Seaway will be self-liquidating.
The toll schedule on freight in 1959 has been as follows:
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TOLL SCHEDULE
Total
St.Lawrenaet Welland* Through
Seaway Canal Passage
Per Gross Registered Ton of Vessel
(Whether laden or in Ballast) $.04 $.02 $.06
Per Ton of Bulk Cargo --------- A0 .02 .42
Per Ton of General Cargo ------ -. 90 .05 .95
tThe Seaway segment consists of the passage from the eastern end of
Lake Ontario to Montreal.
$The Welland Canal consists of the passage from Lake Erie to Lake
Ontario, circumventing the Niagara River and falling entirely within
Canada.
All of the tolls on the Welland passage are collected by the Do-
minion of Canada, reflecting an expenditure by that government of
some $30 million on improvement of the canal to accommodate Sea-
way traffic. Of the collections on the Seaway proper, 71 per cent go
to Canada. In addition to these charges, appropriate tolls have been
established for passenger traffic and for pleasure boats.
Nobody is happy about the level of tolls. The eastern railroads
and New York port officials assert that tolls are too low. Collec-
tions are intended to reimburse the governments in full for annual
costs of $28 million, including capital charges amortized over a fifty-
year period. Of this, $25 million applies to the Seaway - the re-
mainder to the Welland Canal. When the Seaway was originally au-
thorized in 1954, it was expected that the annual charges would be
only $14 million. Rising interest rates and construction costs have
nearly doubled the figure. Tolls should be appropriately higher,
argue the railroads, so as to compensate the government in full.
Actually, even conceding that toll collections may be inadequate
to cover total charges, raising rates significantly could make collec-
tions even smaller. That is, higher tolls would drive traffic off the
waterway, thereby decreasing the total amount collected. For most
commodities, there are attractive alternatives to Seaway movement.
Iron ore, for example, can be moved from Labrador on the Atlantic
Ocean to Baltimore and sent overland by rail to the interior. Grain
can be shipped from Duluth to Buffalo and then moved overland to
New York. The loss of enough of such movements from the Seaway
would make its outlook for self-liquidation even more dismal. In
view of the possibility of decreased traffic, and thus decreased collec-
tions, which might result from an increased toll rate, present toll
rates are probably high enough.
On the other hand, Seaway optimists contend that tolls should be
reduced in order to attract more shipping and raise revenues. Their
argument has theoretical merit. The cost of operating and paying
for the Seaway is almost entirely a fixed cost, varying hardly at all
with the volume of traffic. Thus, increased traffic adds almost noth-
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ing to costs, and every added dollar collected is net revenue. If a
5 per cent cut in tolls would result in a 10 per cent increase in cus-
tomers, the question of self-liquidation would be solved on the favor-
able side.
Such a solution would result in a more rapid achievement of maxi-
mum traffic loads, rather than an increase in total traffic in the long
pull. The present toll schedule contemplates achievement of the
waterway's capacity, estimated at 50 million tons a year, by 1968. If
this level could be reached, instead, by 1964 or 1965, it could turn
the scales of the self-liquidation question. Traffic development is a
slow process, however. It grows somewhat independently of toll
levels. On balance, it would appear that since the tolls are criticized
for being both too low and too high, they are probably about right.
COMPETITIVE STATUS OF THE SEAWAY
The chief competition faced by the Seaway comes from the North
Atlantic Coast, especially the Port of New York, with important sec-
ondary competition from the Gulf Coast. In evaluating this compe-
tition, it should be borne in mind that the Great Lakes shores are
closer to the nation's major export industries and import markets
than any of the other coasts. If the Seaway frontier could compete
with the others on even terms, it would probably develop rapidly into
the major import and export gateway of the country.
However, it cannot compete on even terms. The Seaway is han-
dicapped by the limited capacity of the Welland Canal, by season-
ality, and by preferential railroad treatment of Atlantic and Gulf
traffic. In sum, therefore, the Seaway will have the greatest advan-
tage with respect to shipments originating and terminating directly in
the ports of the lakes, rather than at inland points, and in the western
ports of the lakes, rather than the eastern ports.
Preeminence of the Seaway Hinterland
The Great Lakes shores are closer to the central productive
region of the country than is any coastal frontier. Their tributary
area comprises a broad band extending in length from the Appala-
chian Mountains on the east to the Rockies and, in width, from the
Canadian border south to the Ohio and Missouri Rivers. This area
accounts, in a typical year, for about 45 per cent of the nation's
manufacturing and 48 per cent of its agriculture. The remainder of
the nation's production is divided among the three coasts.
Furthermore, the industries of the area are competitively strong
and expanding. The central coal mining regions of the country are
located here. The Lake Superior District is still the leading source
of iron ore and will continue in this role for many more years. On
this foundation, most of the iron and steel of the country is produced
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in the regions tributary to the lakes, centering in the Pittsburgh and
Chicago districts. The region is rich in the production of aluminum,
plastics, chemicals, and glass. The manufacture of automobiles,
trucks, trailers, and other vehicles, centered in Detroit, is distributed
throughout the area. A preponderance of the country's farm ma-
chinery is built here, as well as manufacturing equipment, and mining
and electrical machinery. Finally, the region is the home of the wheat
belt, the corn belt, the production of meats and other foods, and, in
consequence, the continental center of vast food-processing industries
such as meat packing and flour milling. If the terms of competition
were even, the St. Lawrence Seaway would quickly develop into the
dominant foreign trade route of the country.
The Handicap of Congestion
Of the various handicaps confronting the Seaway, probably the
most serious is the limited capacity of the Welland Canal. Lying
wholly within Canada, the Welland provides a total lift around
Niagara Falls of 327 feet in only 25 miles, a magnificent stairway of
seven modern locks, completed in 1932 at a cost to the Canadian gov-
ernment of $130 million. Of the seven locks, three are twin installa-
tions, permitting traffic to move in both directions simultaneously,
but the other four are single locks, constituting a one-way bottleneck,
especially in bad weather.
The St. Lawrence Seaway toll schedule is based on an expected
volume of 50 million tons by 1968. Against this may be set the cir-
cumstance that the Welland Canal has occasionally been badly con-
gested even before the opening of the Seaway, while carrying only
some 20 to 25 million tons. Of course, a substantial volume of Sea-
way traffic will originate on Lake Ontario, downstream from the
Welland, especially at Hamilton and Toronto, and so will not be af-
fected by this congestion.
Furthermore, the "capacity" of the Welland will be substantially
increased by the circumstances of Seaway traffic. Much depends up-
on the size of the individual vessel traversing the canal. It takes no
longer to lock a big ship through than it does a small one, and the
Seaway ships are running much larger than those of the pre-Seaway
era. As time passes, more and more of the obsolete small vessels
will be retired from service. Furthermore, it takes just as long to
lock an empty vessel as a loaded one, and it is hoped that the tonnage
moving into the lakes may balance better with that moving out, re-
ducing the number of lockages in ballast. Finally, the capacity of
the canal depends very much on the regularity with which vessels ap-
proach it. If all the traffic of the week tries to get through on Mon-
day, its "capacity" is only one-seventh of what it would be if transits
were evenly distributed through the week. It may be hoped that,
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with longer distances to traverse, ships can schedule arrival at the
locks by radio to coincide with the light traffic.
There has, of course, been very serious congestion in the Welland
Canal during the opening season of 1959. However, this should not
be taken as an indication of future expectation. In 1959, crews and
pilots have been unfamiliar with the passage, and Seaway operating
personnel have likewise been undergoing a learning process. Neither
ship nor lock construction have been as well adapted to this passage
as future modifications will make them.
Yet, when all these favorable considerations are taken into ac-
count, a canal troubled by congestion at 25 million tons is not likely
to carry close to SO million without building up high delay costs. Ship
companies estimate that a day's delay costs from $750 to $2,500, de-
pending upon the size of the ship and the pay scale of the crew. In-
terest and insurance on the cargo and the urgency of delivery on
schedule must be added to these costs. As congestion in the Welland
mounts, the competitive strength of the Seaway route will become
progressively impaired.
A potential of 50 million tons will still leave the Seaway far short
of the comparative volumes of the Atlantic and Gulf coasts. By way
of comparison, the Port of New York, alone, handled 148 million
tons in a recent year. Far from being credited to any one port, the
50 million tons of the Seaway will be distributed among all the ports
of the lakes, both Canadian and American. As a volume target, it is
obviously not very high. Until the Welland Canal is provided with
twin locks, no port on the Great Lakes will become a major seaport,
excepting, possibly, Toronto.
The W~inter Freezing
The second competitive handicap of the Seaway is its seasonality.
Over a twenty-year period, the Welland Canal has been open to navi-
gation an average of 241 days per year, just short of eight months.
The St. Lawrence shipping season is of about the same duration. In
other words, for about four months of the year, the entire Seaway
will be covered with ice and completely closed to traffic.
Seasonality will not be a serious handicap for certain bulk ma-
terials such as iron ore and coal which can be stored cheaply in the
open air, nor to grain which, being a seasonal product, has to be
stored somewhere in any case. However, manufactured goods of
high value must be moved promptly to the consignee, and the winter
closing will compel a transfer of routing to salt water ports. Unless
a shipper finds the Seaway much cheaper than conventional routings,
he will often be reluctant to make this transfer. Foreign trade in-
volves highly complex relationships with banks, insurance brokers,
freight forwarders, railroads, and shipping companies, and the ship-
per will often find the annual shift from one port to another too com-
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plex. Finally, the railroads serving the Atlantic and the Gulf ports
will offer strong inducements every spring to hold the summer's traf-
fic to its winter course.
Railroad Cooperation and Competition
To understand the attitude of the railroads towards the St. Law-
rence Seaway, it is necessary to divide them into two groups. The
first consists of the western railroads such as the Chicago and North
Western, and the Milwaukee, terminating at Chicago. Because these
railroads do not serve the Atlantic Coast nor, to any substantial de-
gree, the Gulf Coast, they have everything to gain and little to lose
from the St. Lawrence Seaway. These railroads are offering attrac-
tive export rates and improved services for shipments through the
Seaway, notably by way of such ports as Chicago, Milwaukee, and
Duluth.
The eastern railroads, however, have much more to lose than
to gain from the growth of Seaway traffic. This group serves
not only the lake ports, but also the ports of the Atlantic and the
Gulf which represent longer and more lucrative hauls. Furthermore,
this group of railroads has invested vast sums in waterfront terminal
facilities on the Atlantic and the Gulf and needs to protect this in-
vestment.
The railroads falling within this category consist of almost all
those serving the lake ports east of Chicago, including the Pennsyl-
vania, the New York Central, the Baltimore and Ohio, the Chesa-
peake and Ohio, and numerous others. Still two other lines should
be added to this opposition group, namely the Illinois Central, and
the Gulf, Mobile and Ohio. These two serve the ports of New Or-
leans and Mobile through the Mississippi Valley and, especially with
respect to traffic originating south of St. Louis, will probably be in-
dined to favor the Gulf ports over Chicago. This means that rail-
road competition will be very intense in its opposition to Seaway traf-
fic moving through the ports of Detroit, Toledo, Cleveland, Erie,
Buffalo, and Rochester.
For competitive purposes, the railroads are experimenting with
the "agreed charge" rate system. Under this system, an attractive
rate will be offered to an inland shipper on export and import move-
ments through' an Atlantic or Gulf port with the proviso that a stated
percentage (such as 90 per cent) of all his shipments move by rail
through that coastal area. This would leave only 10 per cent to go
by truck or via the Seaway, and trucking would get most of this. In-
asmuch as the shipper must ship through the Atlantic or Gulf port
during the winter months, this system would seriously discourage the
annual springtime shift to the St. Lawrence Seaway. Railroads can
also offer attractive seaport services, such as the carfloat service in
New York harbor. Under this arrangement, the railroad moves
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loaded box cars on barges to any point in the harbor free of charge,
saving sizeable handling and transfer costs. Because of these prefer-
ences of the eastern and the Gulf Coast rail lines, the St. Lawrence
Seaway will sustain a severe handicap in competition with these
coasts.
Competition with the Port of New York
Finally, the Seaway ports must share with most of our coastal
ports the intense competition with the incomparable Port of New
York. New York enjoys the tremendous advantage of "bigness." In
1957, for example, while the Port of Philadelphia handled 52 million
tons of cargo, New York handled 147 million tons, almost three
times as much. Furthermore, because so much of Philadelphia's
trade consists of crude petroleum, coal, iron ore, and other low-value
commodities, the preeminence of New York in dollar values is even
greater. In 1957, the dollar value of foreign trade moving through
New York amounted to $9.5 billion, while that moving through
Philadelphia was only $1.4 billion. This comparison with Philadel-
phia would be just as striking with any other port on the continent.
A big port is very attractive to shippers because it can support so
many highly specialized services. For example, the foreign exchange
personnel of a large New York bank will have first-hand knowledge
of complex currency restrictions and values in small and remote coun-
tries and will be able to clear drafts quickly with banks of these coun-
tries through numerous foreign branches. A large volume of busi-
ness is required to support such an activity. The same principle ap-
plies to such services as marine insurance, ship repair and supply,
fumigated and refrigerated warehousing, heavy-cargo handling fa-
cilities, protective packaging services, and a host of related services.
New York is rich in the manifold appurtenances of foreign trade.
Furthermore, because of its size, the Port of New York offers
more frequent sailings to obscure foreign destinations than any other
American port. If a shipment misses the boat for Bangkok, for ex-
ample, another will normally be leaving in two or three days, where-
as from a lesser port, such as Baltimore or Boston, there might not
be another for two weeks or more. Frequency of sailings means also
that a shipper from the interior can combine a number of less-than-
carload shipments, each going to a different foreign destination, into
a single carload to New York, thus saving overland freight.
New York also provides direct sailings more than other ports. A
usual itinerary for a ship in process of gathering cargo is to call at
two or three other American ports, such as Mobile, Baltimore, and
Philadelphia, before proceeding to New York for final loading and
departure for overseas. A shipper, therefore, is not likely to direct
an export consignment to Baltimore, for example, if he can pick up
the same ship at New York several days later. This is especially
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true of high value shipments on which interest charges and obsoles-
cence are important. The competitive strength of New York, of
course, makes itself felt in other ports of the Atlantic and the Gulf
as well as in the lake ports. But, because of their status as relative
newcomers in the foreign trade field, the lake ports will feel this com-
petition more keenly.
COMPETITIVE EFFECT ON EASTERN LAKE PORTS AND
INLAND ORIGINS
In view of its competitive handicaps, the St. Lawrence Seaway
will have to continue to share the traffic of its vast natural hinter-
land with the coasts. This is particularly true of the ports of Lake
Erie and Lake Ontario. As one moves east from Chicago, the rail
freight differentials to the Atlantic Coast become progressively
smaller, and the Seaway's handicaps weigh more heavily against it.
The following comparison between shipments to Chicago and Cleve-
land is illuminating:
Total Rail and Water Charges per Ton on Light Machinery
Liverpool to Chicago and Cleveland, 1959
TOTAL CHARGES
Via Via Seaway Percent
New York Seaway Saving Saving
Chicago --------- $56.48 $29A0 $27.08 48%
Cleveland ------- 47.29 28.70 18.59 39%
Obviously, a shipper will be less willing to sustain the delays and sea-
sonal interruptions of the Seaway for a saving of $18.59 than he will
for a saving of $27.08.
The greater competitive strength of the Lake Michigan ports has
already been manifested in the overseas trade through the shallow
St. Lawrence canals before the opening of the Seaway. In 1957, for
example, 210,000 tons moved through Chicago, 56,000 through Mil-
waukee, and 42,000 through Green Bay, Wisconsin. Meanwhile,
Buffalo handled only 8,000 tons and Rochester virtually nothing.
For the latter cities, New York was too close.
Secondly, the Seaway will have to share its hinterland with the
coasts with respect to those traffic origins inland from the lakes.
This applies, for example, to such cities as Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, and
St. Louis. A shipper in Cleveland may save $18.59 by shipping
through the Seaway instead of New York. But, for a shipper from
Cincinnati, much of his $18.59 saving would be eaten up by overland
freight to get his cargo into Cleveland. In view of the, Seaway's con-
gestion and the winter freezing, the small residue of savings would
hardly seem worth-while. The New Orleans Port Authority has re-
cently opened an office in Cincinnati, obviously with little expectation
of losing Cincinnati shipments to the St. Lawrence Seaway. Certain
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Seaway enthusiasts have been counting on a large volume of traffic
originating in Pittsburgh. Officials of the Port of New York Au-
thority hear this with quiet amusement.
In general, therefore, traffic of the St. Lawrence Seaway will be
that originating and terminating in the immediate lake port areas.
The only notable exceptions will be grain, coal, and certain other bulk
commodities.
TRAFFIC PROSPECTS
Taking into account the competitive disadvantages of the Seaway
and weighing them against the wealth of its hinterland, the forecast
of 50 million tons appears a reasonably modest expectation. If we
assume that the Welland Canal can handle this much, it will carry
traffic in the general range of one-third of that moving through New
York harbor. At current toll rates, this promises to make the Sea-
way self-liquidating.
The success of the Seaway will probably not do serious damage
to the eastern railroads nor to the Atlantic Coast ports. In the first
place, the Seaway's role is relatively modest. Secondly, it serves an
expanding economy. During the five years in which it was under con-
struction, the Gross National Product, expressed in dollars of con-
stant purchasing power, increased by about $30 billion, and an addi-
tional $80 billion growth may reasonably be projected to 1965. The
Canadian economy is growing at an even more rapid rate. With its
50-year life ahead, the Seaway is destined to serve two nations vastly
bigger than any this generation has known.
This prospect gives the communities of the Great Lakes a sound
basis for quiet optimism. As a reasonable measure of a respectable
seaport, the Port of Mobile handled 9.4 million tons of foreign com-
merce in 1957. Supposing that Cleveland should be so enterprising
and fortunate as to capture one-fifth of the 50 million-ton total of
the St. Lawrence Seaway, the Port of Cleveland would then challenge
Mobile as to tonnage volume. But, the communities of the Great
Lakes area should not delude themselves with visions of entering the
big leagues of foreign trade along with San Francisco, New Orleans,
or Philadelphia. Should it ever occur, this will be the accomplish-
ment of a later generation.
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